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For lack of general algorithmic methods that apply to wide classes of logics, establishing a com-
plexity bound for a given modal logic is often a laborious task. The present work is a step towards
a general theory of the complexity of modal logics. Our main result is that all rank-1 logics enjoy
a shallow model property and thus are, under mild assumptions on the format of their axioma-
tisation, in PSPACE . This leads to a unified derivation of tight PSPACE -bounds for a number
of logics including K, KD, coalition logic, graded modal logic, majority logic, and probabilistic
modal logic. Our generic algorithm moreover finds tableau proofs that witness pleasant proof-
theoretic properties including a weak subformula property. This generality is made possible by a
coalgebraic semantics, which conveniently abstracts from the details of a given model class and
thus allows covering a broad range of logics in a uniform way.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: F.4.1 [Mathematical Logic and Formal Languages]:
Mathematical Logic—Modal Logic; Computational Logic; F.2.2. [Analysis of Algorithms and
Problem Complexity]: Nonnumerical Algorithms and Problems—Complexity of Proof Proce-
dures
General Terms: Algorithms, Languages, Theory
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1. INTRODUCTION
Modal logics are attractive from a computational point of view, as they often com-
bine expressiveness with decidability. For many modal logics not involving dy-
namic features, satisfiability is known to be in PSPACE . This is typically proved
for one logic at a time, e.g. by modifications of the witness algorithm for the
modal logic K [Ladner 1977; Blackburn et al. 2001], but also using markedly dif-
ferent methods such as the constraint-based PSPACE -algorithm for graded modal
logic [Tobies 2001]. Vardi [1989] gives a first glimpse of a generalisable method,
equipping various epistemic logics with a neighbourhood frame semantics and show-
ing them to be in NP and PSPACE , respectively (with the K axiom being respon-
sible for PSPACE -hardness; recent work by Halpern and Reˆgo [2007] shows that
negative introspection brings the complexity back down to NP). Nevertheless, there
is to date no generally applicable theorem that allows establishing PSPACE -bounds
for large classes of modal logics in a uniform way.
Here, we generalise the methods of [Vardi 1989] to obtain PSPACE bounds for
rank-1 modal logics, i.e. logics axiomatisable by formulas whose modal depth uni-
formly equals one, in a systematic way. Although presently limited to rank 1, our
approach covers numerous relevant and non-trivial examples. We recover known
PSPACE bounds not only for normal modal logics such as K and KD, but most
notably also for a range of non-normal modal logics such as graded modal logic [Fine
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1972], coalition logic [Pauly 2002], and probabilistic modal logic [Larsen and Skou
1991; Heifetz and Mongin 2001]. Moreover, our methods lead to a previously un-
known PSPACE upper bound for majority logic [Pacuit and Salame 2004] that
was independently discovered by Demri and Lugiez [2006] at the same time. These
logics are far from exotic: graded modal logic plays a role e.g. in decision sup-
port and knowledge representation [van der Hoek and Meyer 1992; Ohlbach and
Koehler 1999], and probabilistic modal logic has appeared in connection with model
checking [Larsen and Skou 1991] and in modelling economic behaviour [Heifetz and
Mongin 2001].
The key to such a degree of generality is to parametrise the theory over the type
of systems defining the semantics, using coalgebraic methods. Coalgebra conve-
niently abstracts from the details of a concrete class of models as it encapsulates
the precise nature of models in an endofunctor on the category of sets. As spe-
cific instances, one obtains e.g. (serial) Kripke frames, (monotone) neighbourhood
frames [Hansen and Kupke 2004], game frames [Pauly 2002], probabilistic transi-
tion systems and automata [Rabin 1963; Bartels et al. 2004], weighted automata,
linear automata [Carlyle and Paz 1971], and multigraphs [D’Agostino and Visser
2002]. Despite the broad range of systems covered by the coalgebraic approach,
a substantial body of concepts and non-trivial results has emerged, encompassing
e.g. generic notions of bisimilarity and coinduction [Bartels 2003], corecursion [Turi
and Plotkin 1997], duality, and ultrafilter extensions [Kupke et al. 2005]. On the
applications side, coalgebraic modal logic features in actual specification languages
such as the object oriented specification language CCSL [Rothe et al. 2001] and
CoCasl [Mossakowski et al. 2006].
The coalgebraic study of computational aspects of modal logic was initiated
in [Schro¨der 2007], where the finite model property and associated NEXPTIME -
bounds were proved. Here, we push these results further and present a shallow
model property based on coalgebraic semantics. This leads to a generic PSPACE -
algorithm for deciding satisfiability that traverses a shallow model and strips off
one layer of modalities in every step. Alternatively, our algorithm may be seen as
computing a shallow proof that enjoys a number of pleasant proof-theoretic prop-
erties, including a weak subformula property (i.e. it mentions only propositional
combinations of subformulas of the goal).
The model construction relies on extending the axiomatisation of a given logic
to a set of rules which is closed under rule resolution, i.e. every resolvent of two
substituted rule conclusions can also be derived directly using a third rule. This
process typically results in an infinite but recursive set of rules. Resolution closed-
ness then enables us to build the shallow model using induction on the modal depth
of formulas. Since we are working with an infinite set of rules, we have to impose
a second condition to ensure that we can decide satisfiability: a rule set is closed
under contraction if every substituted rule conclusion with duplicate literals can
be derived using a substitution instance of a second rule in whose conclusion all
literals remain distinct. The decision procedure will run in PSPACE if both clo-
sure under resolution and closure under contraction can be controlled, i.e. there is
a polynomial bound on the size of rules that are applicable at every step of the
deductive process. This turns out to be the case for all examples mentioned above.
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The material is organised as follows. In Section 2, we give a brief introduction to
the generic coalgebraic semantics of modal logic. In Section 3, we discuss deduction
systems for coalgebraic modal logics and their properties, notably the (equivalent)
central notions of strict one-step completeness and reduction closedness of rule sets.
Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to the tableau-based shallow model construction and
the proof-theoretic view thereof. The ensuing PSPACE -algorithm and its example
applications are presented in Section 6.
2. COALGEBRAIC MODAL LOGIC
We briefly recapitulate the basics of the coalgebraic interpretation of modal logic.
To begin, we fix the syntactic framework. A modal signature is just a set Λ of
unary modal operators (all our results generalise straightforwardly to a polyadic
setting as in [Schro¨der 2005]). The signature Λ induces a modal language F(Λ),
with formulas φ, ψ ∈ F(Λ) defined by the grammar
φ ::= ⊥ | φ ∧ ψ | ¬φ | Lφ,
where L ranges over Λ. Disjunctions φ ∨ ψ, truth ⊤, and other boolean operations
are defined as usual. The depth of a formula is its maximal nesting depth of modal
operators.
We work in the framework of coalgebraic modal logic, introduced by Pattinson
[2004], generalising previous results [Jacobs 2000; Ro¨ßiger 2000; Kurz 2001; Pattin-
son 2001], where modal languages are interpreted over coalgebras for a Set-functor:
Definition 2.1. [Rutten 2000] Let T : Set→ Set be a functor, referred to as the
signature functor, where Set is the category of sets. A T -coalgebra A = (X, ξ) is
a pair (X, ξ) where X is a set (of states) and ξ : X → TX is a function called the
transition function. A morphism f : A→ B between T -coalgebras A = (X, ξ) and
B = (Y, ζ) is a map f : X → Y such that Tfξ = ζf .
We view coalgebras as generalised transition systems: the transition function de-
livers a structured set of successors and observations for a state. Mutatis mutandis,
we can in fact allow T to take proper classes as values, as we never iterate T or
otherwise assume that TX is a set; details are left implicit. This allows us to treat
more examples, in particular Pauly’s coalition logic (Example 2.7.8 below).
Assumption 2.2. We can assume w.l.o.g. that T preserves injective maps [Barr
1993]. For convenience of notation, we will in fact sometimes assume that TX ⊆ TY
in case X ⊆ Y . Moreover, we assume w.l.o.g. that T is non-trivial, i.e. TX = ∅ =⇒
X = ∅ (otherwise, TX = ∅ for all X).
Definition 2.3. If for a subset Z ⊆ X of a coalgebra A = (X, ξ), ξ restricts to
a map ξZ : Z → TZ, then C = (Z, ξZ) is a subcoalgbra of A; in this case, the
inclusion Z →֒ X is a morphism C → A.
In the same way that the signature functor abstracts from a concrete class of
models, the interpretation of modal operators is encapsulated in terms of predicate
liftings:
Definition 2.4. A predicate lifting for a functor T is a natural transformation
Q → Q ◦ T op,
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where Q denotes the contravariant powerset functor Setop → Set (i.e. Q(X) =
P(X) is the powerset, and Qf(B) = f−1[B] for f : X → Y and B ∈ Q(X)).
A coalgebraic semantics for a modal signature Λ is given by a Λ-structure, consisting
of a signature functor T and an assignment of a predicate lifting [[L]] for T to every
modal operator L ∈ Λ; by abuse of notation, we refer to the entire Λ-structure just
as T . Given a Λ-structure T , the satisfaction relation |=C between states x of a
T -coalgebra C = (X, ξ) and F(Λ)-formulas is defined inductively, with the usual
clauses for the boolean operations. The clause for the modal operator L is
x |=C Lφ ⇐⇒ ξ(x) ∈ [[L]]C([[φ]]C),
where [[φ]]C = {x ∈ X | x |=C φ}. We drop the subscripts C when these are clear
from the context.
We occasionally make use of the fact that the logic F(Λ) is adequate for T -
coalgebras [Pattinson 2004]:
Proposition 2.5. If f : A→ B is a morphism of T -coalgebras, then
x |=A φ iff f(x) |=B φ
for all states x in A and all F(Λ)-formulas φ.
Our main interest here is in the local satisfiability problem:
Definition 2.6. An F(Λ)-formula φ is satisfiable (over T ) if there exist a T -
coalgebra A = (X, ξ) and a state x in X such that x |=A φ. Dually, φ is valid
if x |=A φ for all T -coalgebras A = (X, ξ) and all x ∈ X .
Example 2.7. [Pattinson 2004; Cıˆrstea and Pattinson 2007; Schro¨der 2007] We
illustrate how the coalgebraic approach subsumes a large class of modal logics.
This includes not only logics with a standard Kripke semantics, but in particular
also non-normal modal logics whose semantics is defined over structures that differ
substantially from classical Kripke frames.
(1) Modal logic K: The signature ΛK of the modal logic K consists of a single
modal operator ✷. Let P be the covariant powerset functor. Then P-coalgebras are
graphs, thought of as transition systems or indeed Kripke frames. A ΛK-structure
over P is defined by
[[✷]]X(A) = {B ∈ P(X) | B ⊆ A};
this induces precisely the standard Kripke semantics of modal logic (note that no
restrictions are imposed on frames).
(2) Modal logic KD: KD is obtained from K by adding the axiom ¬✷⊥, i.e.
by restricting the semantics to serial Kripke frames (X,R), characterized by the
condition that for every state x, there exists a state y such that xRy. Thus, the
signature ΛKD of the normal modal logic KD is the same as that of K, and a ΛKD-
structure is defined in the same way as for K, but over the non-empty powerset
functor P∗ defined by P∗(X) = {A ∈ P(X) | A 6= ∅}.
(3) Modal logic E: The signature ΛE of the modal logic E, the smallest classi-
cal modal logic [Chellas 1980], has a single modal operator ✷; the proof system of
E comprises, besides propositional reasoning, only replacement of equivalents (i.e.
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the rule a ↔ b/✷a→ ✷b). The standard neighbourhood semantics of E is coalge-
braically captured by a ΛE-structure over the neighbourhood functor N = Q ◦Qop
(composition of the contravariant powerset functor with itself); coalgebras for this
functor are neighbourhood frames. The modal operator ✷ is interpreted over N by
[[✷]]X(A) = {α ∈ N(X) | A ∈ α}.
(4) Modal logic M : The modal logic M , the smallest monotonic modal
logic [Chellas 1980], is obtained from the modal logic E by adding the mono-
tonicity rule a → b/✷a → ✷b. The neighbourhood semantics of M is captured
coalgebraically analogously to the previous example as a structure over the sub-
functor UpP of N assigning to a set X the set of upwards closed subsets of QX .
Coalgebras for UpP are monotone neighbourhood frames [Hansen and Kupke 2004].
(5) Graded modal logic [Fine 1972]: The modal signature of graded modal logic
(GML) is ΛGML = {✸k | k ∈ N}; the intended reading of ✸kφ is ‘φ holds in more
than k successor states’. The semantics of GML is originally defined by count-
ing successor states in Kripke frames. This semantics fails to be coalgebraic, as
the naturality condition for the associated predicate liftings fails. However, one
may define a coalgebraic semantics which is equivalent for purposes of satisfiabil-
ity [Schro¨der 2007], as follows. The finite multiset (or bag) functor B maps a set X
to the set of maps B : X → N with finite support, the intuition being that B is
a multiset containing x ∈ X with multiplicity B(x). We extend B to P(X) by
putting B(A) =
∑
x∈AB(x). The action on morphisms f : X → Y is then given by
Bf : BX → BY,B 7→ λy.B(f−1[{y}]). Coalgebras for B are directed graphs with
N-weighted edges, often referred to as multigraphs [D’Agostino and Visser 2002].
The graded modal operator ✸k is intepreted over B by
[[✸k]]X(A) = {B : X → N ∈ B(X) | B(A) > k}.
Thus, x  ✸kφ for a state x in a B-coalgebra iff φ holds for more than k successor
states of x, taking into account multiplicities.
The dual operators ¬✸k¬ are denoted k, i.e. kφ reads ‘φ fails in at most k
successor states’. Note that k is monotone, but fails to be normal unless k = 0. A
non-monotone variation of GML arises when negative multiplicities are admitted.
(6) Majority logic [Pacuit and Salame 2004]: Graded modal logic is extended to
majority logic by adding a weak majority operator W , read ‘in at least half of the
successor states, it is the case that . . . ’. The structure for GML over the multiset
functor B described in the previous example is extended to W by putting
[[W ]]X(A) = {B : X → N ∈ B(X) | B(A) ≥ B(X −A)}.
The dual operator M = ¬W¬ captures strict majority ‘in more than half of the
successor states, it is the case that’.
(7) Probabilistic modal logic [Larsen and Skou 1991; Heifetz and Mongin 2001]:
The modal signature ΛPML of probabilistic modal logic (PML) comprises opera-
tors Lp, p ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q, to be read ‘in the next step, it is with probability at least p
the case that. . . ’. We define a ΛPML-structure over the finite distribution func-
tor Dω which maps a set X to the set of probability distributions on X with finite
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support. Coalgebras for Dω are probabilistic transition systems (also called prob-
abilistic type spaces [Heifetz and Mongin 2001]) with finite branching degree. Our
definition contrasts with that of [Heifetz and Mongin 2001], where there is no re-
striction on the branching degree, but since PML has the finite model property (cf.
loc. cit.), this has no bearing on satisfiability. The interpretation of Lp over Dω is
defined by
[[Lp]](A) = {P ∈ DωX | PA ≥ p}.
PML is non-normal (Lp(a ∨ b)→ Lpa ∨ Lpb is not valid for p > 0).
(8) Coalition logic [Pauly 2002]: Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a fixed set of agents.
Subsets of N are called coalitions. The signature ΛCoal of coalition logic consists
of modal operators [C], where C ranges over coalitions, read ‘coalition C has a
collaborative strategy to ensure that . . . ’. A coalgebraic semantics for coalition
logic is based on the class-valued signature functor T defined by
TX = {(S1, . . . , Sn, f) | ∅ 6= Si ∈ Set, f :
∏
i∈N Si → X}.
The elements of TX are understood as strategic games with set X of states, i.e.
tuples consisting of nonempty sets Si of strategies for all agents i, and an outcome
function (
∏
Si)→ X . A T -coalgebra is a game frame [Pauly 2002]. We denote the
set
∏
i∈C Si by SC , and for σC ∈ SC , σC¯ ∈ SC¯ , where C¯ = N−C, (σC , σC¯) denotes
the obvious element of
∏
i∈N Si. A ΛCoal -structure over T is then defined by
[[[C]]]X(A) = {(S1, . . . , Sn, f) ∈ TX | ∃σC ∈ SC . ∀σC¯ ∈ SC¯ . f(σC , σC¯) ∈ A}.
All the above examples can be canonically extended to systems that process
inputs from a set I by passing from the signature functor T to one of the functors T I
or T (I × ) and suitably indexing the modal operators. We refer to [Cıˆrstea and
Pattinson 2007] for a detailed account of the induced logics.
Remark 2.8. In the modal grammar given above, atomic propositional symbols
are deliberately not included. This is for the sake of both generality, as some
modal logics such as Hennessy-Milner logic do not include such atomic propositions,
and economy of presentation, as a set U of atomic propositional symbols may be
integrated in the basic framework as follows. Given a modal signature Λ and a
Λ-structure T , we define a structure for the modal signature ΛU = Λ ∪ U over the
functor TU defined by TUX = TX×P(U): modal operators from Λ are interpreted
by taking the preimage of their interpretation over T under the projection TU → T ,
and a propositional symbol a ∈ U is interpreted by putting
[[a]]X(A) = {(t, B) ∈ TX × P(U) | a ∈ B}.
Since [[a]] is independent of its argument, the modal operator a can be written as
just the propositional symbol a (without an argument formula). In a framework
with polyadic modal operators [Schro¨der 2005], propositional constants correspond
to nullary modalities. Some of the logics above indeed require propositional symbols
lest they collapse into triviality. This holds in those cases where T 1 (for 1 a singleton
set) is a singleton, e.g. probabilistic modal logic, coalition logic, and the modal
logic KD . We nevertheless generally continue to omit the treatment of propositional
symbols in the sequel, since the addition of propositional symbols as indicated above
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has no bearing on the rule sets forming the core of our method, and the model
construction is entirely analogous.
3. PROOF SYSTEMS FOR COALGEBRAIC MODAL LOGIC
Our decision procedure for rank-1 logics relies on a complete axiomatisation in a
certain format. Deduction for modal logics with coalgebraic semantics has been
considered in [Pattinson 2003; Cıˆrstea and Pattinson 2007; Kupke et al. 2005;
Schro¨der 2007]. It has been shown that every modal logic over coalgebras can be
axiomatised in rank 1 using either rank-1 axioms or rules leading from rank 0 to
rank 1 [Schro¨der 2007], essentially because functors, as opposed to comonads, only
encode the one-step behaviour of systems. Here, we focus on rules. The crucial
ingredients for the shallow model construction and the ensuing PSPACE algorithm
are novel notions of resolution closure and strict one-step completeness of rule sets.
For the remainder of the paper, we fix a modal signature Λ and a Λ-structure T .
We recall a few basic notions from propositional logic, as well as notation for coal-
gebraic modal logic introduced in [Pattinson 2003; Cıˆrstea and Pattinson 2007]:
Definition 3.1. We denote the set of propositional formulas over a set V (con-
sisting e.g. of propositional variables or modal formulas) by Prop(V ). Here, we
regard ¬ and ∧ as the basic connectives, with all other connectives defined in the
standard way. For φ, ψ ∈ Prop(V ), we say that φ propositionally entails ψ and write
φ ⊢PL ψ if φ→ ψ is a propositional tautology. Similarly, Φ ⊆ Prop(V ) proposition-
ally entails ψ (Φ ⊢PL ψ) if there exist φ1, . . . , φn ∈ Φ such that φ1 ∧· · · ∧φn ⊢PL ψ.
A literal over V is either an element of V or the negation of such an element. We
use the meta-variable ǫ (possibly indexed) to denote either nothing or ¬, so that a
literal over V has the general form ǫa, a ∈ V . A clause is a finite (possibly empty)
disjunction of literals, which then takes the form
∨n
i=1 ǫiai with a1, . . . , an ∈ V .
Similarly, a conjunctive clause is a finite conjunction of literals. A (conjunctive)
clause is contracted if all its literals are distinct. The set of all clauses over V
is denoted by Cl(V ). Although we regard clauses as formulas rather than sets of
literals, we shall sometimes use terminology such as ‘a literal is contained in a
clause’ or ‘a clause contains another’, with the obvious meaning. We denote by
Up(V ) the set {La | L ∈ Λ, a ∈ V }.
If V consists of propositional variables, then we have the usual notions of valua-
tion and substitution: A valuation is just a map κ : V → {⊤,⊥} assigning boolean
truth values to variables; for φ ∈ Prop(V ), we write κ |= φ if κ is a satisfying
valuation for φ. More generally, given a set X , a P(X)-valuation for V is a map
V → P(X). For φ ∈ Prop(V ), a P(X)-valuation τ induces in the obvious way a
subset [[φ]]τ of X ; we write X, τ |= φ if [[φ]]τ = X . Using the structure T for Λ, we
interpret ψ ∈ Prop(Up(V )) as a subset [[ψ]]τ of TX by putting [[Lφ]]τ = [[L]][[φ]]τ ,
and we write TX, τ |= ψ if [[ψ]]τ = TX . Moreover, given a set Z, a Z-substitution
for V is a map σ : V → Z; for a formula φ over V (e.g. φ ∈ Prop(Up(Prop(V )))),
we denote the result of performing the substitution σ on φ by φσ and refer to φσ
as a Z-instance of φ.
Lemma 3.2. For φ, ψ ∈ Cl(V ), φ ⊢PL ψ iff either φ is contained in ψ or ψ is a
tautology (i.e. contains both a and ¬a for some a ∈ V ).
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Definition 3.3. A (one-step) rule R over a set V of propositional variables is
a rule φ/ψ, where φ ∈ Prop(V ) and ψ ∈ Cl(Up(V )). We silently identify rules
modulo α-equivalence. The rule R is sound if, whenever φσ is valid for an F(Λ)-
substitution σ, then ψσ is valid. Moreover, R is one-step sound if TX, τ |= ψ for
each set X and each P(X)-valuation τ such that X, τ |= φ.
Our hitherto informal use of the term rank-1 logic formally means axiomatisable
by one-step rules. The term rank-1 logic has been used in the literature [Pattinson
2003; Cıˆrstea and Pattinson 2007; Kupke et al. 2005; Schro¨der 2007] to describe
logics axiomatisable by rank-1 axioms, i.e. propositional combinations of formu-
las Lφ where L is a modal operator and φ is purely propositional (in the notation
introduced above, formulas from Prop(Up(Prop(V )))). This class of axioms includes
e.g. the K axiom ✷(a → b) → (✷a → ✷b), but excludes axioms containing nested
modalities or top-level propositional variables such as the axioms 4 and T , respec-
tively. It has been shown in [Schro¨der 2007] that one-step rules and rank-1 axioms
determine the same class of logics.
Remark 3.4. We can always assume that every propositional variable a appear-
ing in the premise φ of a one-step rule appears also in the conclusion: otherwise,
we can eliminate a by passing from φ to φ[⊤/a] ∨ φ[⊥/a].
Proposition 3.5. [Schro¨der 2007] Every one-step sound rule is sound.
The converse holds under additional assumptions [Schro¨der 2005]; note however
that the obviously sound rule ⊥/⊥ is one-step sound iff T ∅ = ∅ (as is the case e.g.
for PML).
A given set R of one-step sound rules induces a proof system for F(Λ) as follows.
Definition 3.6. Let RC denote the set of rules obtained by extending R with the
congruence rule
(C)
a↔ b
La→ Lb
for every L ∈ Λ. (This rule of course implies a rule where→ is replaced by↔, which
however does not fit the format for one-step rules.) The set of provable formulas
is the smallest set closed under propositional entailment and the rules in RC , with
propositional variables instantiated to formulas in F(Λ). We say that a formula φ
is consistent if ¬φ is not provable.
It is easy to see that this proof system is sound. Completeness requires ‘enough’
rules in the following sense.
Definition 3.7. The set R is (strictly) one-step complete if, whenever TX, τ |= χ
for a set X , χ ∈ Cl(Up(V )), and a P(X)-valuation τ , then χ is (strictly) provable
over X, τ , i.e. propositionally entailed by clauses (a clause) ψσ where φ/ψ ∈ RC
(Definition 3.6) and σ is a Prop(V )-substitution (a V -substitution) such that X, τ |=
φσ.
Strict one-step completeness is one of crucial notions in this work. Its distinc-
tive feature is that strict provability largely dispenses with propositional reasoning
by restricting instantiations to propositional variables, and by replacing general
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propositional entailment by the rather trivial concept of propositional entailment
between single clauses (cf. Lemma 3.2). This plays a central role in the shallow
model construction presented in Section 4.
Remark 3.8. It is shown in [Schro¨der 2007] that the set of all one-step sound
rules is always strictly one-step complete and that the proof system induced by a
one-step complete set of rules is weakly complete, i.e. proves all valid formulas.
In the further treatment, we need a further technical condition.
Definition 3.9. A one-step rule φ/ψ over V is injective if every variable in V
occurs at most once in ψ.
Assumption 3.10. We assume for the remainder of the paper that the given rules
in R are injective. This restriction will be satisfied by the naturally arising rule sets
in our examples; it can always be forced by introducing new propositional variables
and adding premises stating the equivalence to the original variables (e.g. a rule
⊤/(✷a→ ✸a) can be replaced by (a↔ b)/(✷a→ ✸b)).
Strictly one-step complete sets of rules are generally more complicated than one-
step complete sets of rules or axioms [Pattinson 2003; Schro¨der 2007]. In our
terminology, part of the effort of [Vardi 1989] and [Pauly 2002] is devoted to finding
strictly one-step complete sets of rules. We now develop a systematic procedure for
turning one-step complete rule sets into strictly one-step complete ones. For the
following, recall that given clauses φ and ψ containing literals a and ¬a, respectively,
a resolvent of φ and ψ (at a) is obtained by removing a and ¬a from the clause
φ ∨ ψ. A set Φ of clauses is called resolution closed if, for φ, ψ ∈ Φ, all resolvents
of φ and ψ are propositionally entailed by some clause in Φ. This is generalised to
rules as follows:
Definition 3.11. A set R of one-step rules is resolution closed if it satisfies the
following requirement. Let R1, R2 ∈ R, where R1 = φ1/ψ1 and R2 = φ2/ψ2. We
can assume that R1 and R2 have disjoint sets V1, V2 of propositional variables. Let
La be in ψ1, and let ¬Lb be in ψ2 for some L ∈ Λ, so that we have a resolvent
ψ¯ of ψ1 and ψ2[a/b] at La; by Assumption 3.10, ψ¯ is a clause over Up(V ) where
V = V1 ∪ V2 − {a, b}. Then RC is required to contain a rule R = φ/ψ such
φ1 ∧ φ2[a/b] ⊢PL φσ and ψσ ⊢PL ψ¯ for some V -substitution σ; in this case, R is
called a resolvent of R1 and R2.
Resolution closure will play a central role in the following development, as it forms
the syntactic counterpart of strict one-step completeness.
Remark 3.12. One can construct resolution closed sets by iterated addition of
missing resolvents. Here, an obvious choice for a resolvent φ/ψ of φ1/ψ1 and φ2/ψ2
as above is to take ψ as the resolvent ψ¯ of ψ1 and ψ2, and φ as φ1 ∧φ2[a/b], with a
eliminated according to Remark 3.4 as a is not contained in ψ by Assumption 3.10.
It is clear that φ1 ∧ φ2[a/b]/ψ¯ is one-step sound if R1 and R2 are one-step sound.
Remark 3.13. Note that our approach is different to existing resolution-based
approaches to decision procedures for modal logic (e.g. [De Nivelle et al. 2000]),
which rely on translating modal logic into first-order logic.
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Lemma 3.14. Let ψ ∈ Cl(V ), and let ∅ 6= Φ ⊆ Cl(V ) be resolution closed. Then
Φ ⊢PL ψ iff φ ⊢PL ψ for some φ ∈ Φ.
Proof. The ‘if’ direction is clear. ‘Only if’: W.l.o.g. ψ is not a tautology. We
can assume that V is finite and then prove the contraposition of the claim by
induction over the size of V . Thus assume, recalling Lemma 3.2, that Φ does not
contain a subclause of ψ. Pick a clause χ ∈ Φ that contains a minimal number of
literals not in ψ (this number is non-zero); w.l.o.g. χ contains a positive literal a
such that a is not in ψ. Remove all clauses containing a from Φ, and remove ¬a
from the remaining clauses and from ψ, obtaining a new set Φ′ of clauses and a
new clause ψ′, respectively. Then Φ′ is resolution closed and does not contain a
subclause of ψ′ (otherwise there exists a clause ρ ∈ Φ whose only literal not in ψ
is ¬a, and resolving ρ with χ yields a clause in Φ with less literals not in ψ than χ,
contradiction). By induction we thus have a valuation τ ′ for V − {a} satisfying Φ′
but not ψ′. We extend τ ′ to a valuation τ for V by putting τ(a) = ⊤; then τ
satisfies Φ but not ψ.
Lemma 3.15. R is resolution closed iff RC is resolution closed.
Proof. The ‘if’ direction is trivial. The ‘only if’ direction follows from the
fact that every rule R is a resolvent of R and any congruence rule, since rules are
injective (Assumption 3.10).
Theorem 3.16. Let R be one-step complete. Then R is strictly one-step com-
plete iff R is resolution closed.
Proof. ‘If ’: Let X be a set, let τ be a P(X)-valuation, and let χ ∈ Cl(Up(V ))
such that TX, τ |= χ; w.l.o.g. χ is not a tautology. By one-step completeness, χ is
propositionally entailed by the (non-empty) set of clauses
Ψ = {ψσ | φ/ψ ∈ RC , σ a Prop(V )-substitution, X, τ |= φσ}.
The set Ψ is resolution closed: for i = 1, 2, let φi/ψi ∈ RC be a rule over Wi
(with W1, W2 disjoint), let σi be a Prop(V )-substitution such that X, τ |= φiσi,
and let ψ1σ1 and ψ2σ2 contain literals Lρ and ¬Lρ, respectively. Thus, ψ1 and ψ2
contain literals La and ¬Lb, respectively, where σ1(a) = σ2(b) = ρ; let ψ¯ be the
resolvent of ψ1, ψ2[a/b] at La, a clause over W = W1 ∪ W2 − {a, b}. Then the
resolvent of ψ1σ1, ψ2σ2 at Lρ is ψ¯σ, where σ acts like σ1 onW1−{a} and like σ2 on
W2−{b}. By resolution closedness of RC (Lemma 3.15), we have φ/ψ ∈ RC and a
W -substitution θ such that φ1 ∧ φ2[a/b] ⊢PL φθ and ψθ ⊢PL ψ¯. Then X, τ |= φθσ,
so that ψθσ ∈ Ψ, and ψθσ ⊢PL ψ¯σ as required.
By Lemma 3.14, it now follows that ψσ ⊢PL χ for some clause ψσ in Ψ, where
by Lemma 3.2 necessarily σ(v) ∈ V for every variable v in ψ.
‘Only if ’: Let φ1/ψ2, φ2/ψ2 ∈ R be rules over disjoint sets V1, V2 of variables,
where ψ1 contains La and ψ2 contains ¬Lb. Let ψ¯ denote the resolvent of ψ1, ψ2[a/b]
at La, a clause over V = V1 ∪ V2 −{a, b}. Let X be the set of satisfying valuations
for φ1 ∧ φ2[a/b], and define the P(X)-valuation τ by τ(a) = {κ ∈ X | κ(a) = ⊤}.
Then X, τ |= φ1 ∧ φ2[a/b] and hence TX, τ |= ψ¯ by one-step soundness of R. By
strict one-step completeness, it follows that there exists a rule φ/ψ ∈ RC and a
V -substitution σ such that X, τ |= φσ and ψσ ⊢PL ψ¯. By construction of X, τ , we
may conclude from X, τ |= φσ that φ1 ∧ φ2[a/b] ⊢PL φσ as required.
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In summary, strictly one-step complete rule sets can be constructed by resolving
the rules of a one-step complete axiomatisation against each other. Below, we give
examples of strictly one-step complete systems obtained in this way. In order to
simplify the presentation for the case of graded modal logic and probabilistic modal
logic, we use the following notation. If φi is a formula, ri ∈ Z for all i ∈ I, and
k ∈ Z, we abbreviate∑
i∈I
riφi ≥ k ≡
∧
J⊆I
r(J)<k
( ∧
j∈J
φj →
∨
j /∈J
φj
)
,
where r(J) =
∑
j∈J rj . The formula
∑
i∈I riai ≥ k translates into the arithmetic
of characteristic functions as suggested by the notation:
Lemma 3.17. An element x ∈ X belongs to the interpretation of
∑
i∈I riai ≥ k
under a P(X)-valuation σ iff ∑
i∈I
ri1σ(ai)(x) ≥ k,
where 1A : X → {0, 1} is the characteristic function of A ⊆ X.
Proof. The element x satisfies the negation of
∑
i∈I riai ≥ k iff r(J) < k for
J = {i ∈ I | x ∈ σ(ai)} iff
∑
i∈I ri1σ(ai)(x) < k.
We allow ourselves obvious variations of this notation, e.g.
∑
ai ≤
∑
bj in place
of
∑
bj −
∑
ai ≥ 0.
In all the logics of Example 2.7, the resolution process, applied to known one-step
complete rule sets, can be kept under control; by Theorem 3.16, the resulting rule
sets are strictly one-step complete.
Example 3.18. (1) Modal logic E: The empty set of rules is one-step complete
for neighbourhood frame semantics (Example 2.7.3). This set is trivially resolution
closed.
(2) Modal logic M : The one-step rule
(M)
a→ b
✷a→ ✷b
is one-step complete for monotone neighbourhood frame semantics (Example 2.7.3),
and clearly resolution closed.
(3) Modal logic K: The one-step rules
a
✷a
a ∧ b→ c
✷a ∧ ✷b→ ✷c
are one-step complete for unrestricted Kripke semantics (Example 2.7.1), i.e. for
the modal logic K [Pattinson 2003]. The resolution closure R of these rules consists
of the rules ∧n
i=1 ai → b∧n
i=1 ✷ai → ✷b
for all n ∈ N (here, strict one-step completeness is also easily seen directly). Note
the similarity between this rule and a corresponding rule appearing in standard
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cut-free sequent calculi for K [Troelstra and Schwichtenberg 1996]; the precise
connection between resolution closure and cut elimination is the subject of further
investigation.
(4) Modal logic KD: The axiomatisation ofK is extended to a one-step complete
axiomatisation of KD (Example 2.7.2) by adding the rule ¬a/¬✷a. Closing the
new rule set under resolution leads to the rules∧n
i=1 ai → b∧n
i=1 ✷ai → ✷b
and
¬
∧n
i=1 ai
¬
∧n
i=1 ✷ai
for all n ∈ N (i.e. where the rules of K apply only to positive Horn clauses, the
rules of KD apply to arbitrary Horn clauses).
(5) Coalition logic: In Lemma 6.1 of [Pauly 2002], the following set of one-step
rules for coalition logic (Example 2.7.8), numbered as in loc. cit., is implicit:
(1)
∨n
i=1 ¬ai∨n
i=1 ¬[Ci]ai
(2)
a
[C]a
(3)
a ∨ b
[0]a ∨ [N ]b
(4)
∧n
i=1 ai → b∧n
i=1[Ci]ai → [
⋃
Ci]b
where n ≥ 0, and rules (1) and (4) are subject to the side condition that the Ci are
pairwise disjoint.
As shown in [Pauly 2002], an axiomatization subsumed by rules (1)–(4) is complete
for a language including propositional symbols; one-step completeness follows by
Proposition 5.3 below. The rules are moreover ‘nearly’ resolution closed (full res-
olution closure is not needed in [Pauly 2002] due to the use of a taylored notion
of closed rule set). Resolving rule (4) with rules (2) and (3), one obtains the rule
schema
(4′)
∧n
i=1 ai → b ∨
∨m
j=1 cj∧n
i=1[Ci]ai → [D]b ∨
∨m
j=1[N ]cj
where m,n ≥ 0, subject to the side condition that the Ci are pairwise disjoint
subsets of D; this subsumes rules (2)–(4) above.
Resolution closedness of rules (1) and (4’): We discuss only the case of resolving
(4′) against itself; the other case is similar. Let one instance of (4′) be denoted as
in the rule schema, and another instance with all entities primed (a′i etc.). The
two instances can be resolved in two essentially different ways. The subcase where
matching is with [D]b is straightforward. Thus assume w.l.o.g. that matching is via
[N ]c1 ≡ [C′1]a
′
1. Then by the side conditions, D
′ = N and C′i = ∅ for i = 2, . . . , n
′.
Thus, the resolvent has the conclusion∧n
i=1[Ci]ai ∧
∧n′
i=2[C
′
i]a
′
i → [D]b ∨ [N ]b
′ ∨
∨m
j=2[N ]cj ∨
∨m′
j=1[N ]c
′
j ,
which fits the format of the rule scheme (4′). It is easy to check that the combined
premises imply the required premise for the resolved conclusion, and similarly for
the side conditions.
(6) Graded modal logic: The standard axiomatization of graded modal logic,
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weakly complete for a language with propositional symbols [Caro 1988], has axioms
(G1) ✸n+1a→ ✸na
(G2) 0(a→ b)→ ✸na→ ✸nb
(G3) ✸!0(a ∧ b)→ ((✸!n1a ∧✸!n2b)→ ✸!n1+n2(a ∨ b))
(N) 0⊤
where n, n1, n2 ∈ N, used in a proof system including propositional reasoning and
the congruence rule (so that (N) induces the necessition rule for 0). Here, ✸!nφ
abbreviates ✸n−1φ ∧ ¬✸nφ for n > 0, and ¬✸0φ for n = 0. These axioms may be
derived from the system of one-step rules
(RG1)
a→ b
✸n+1a→ ✸nb
(A1)
c→ a ∨ b
✸n1+n2c→ ✸n1a ∨✸n2b
(A2)
a ∨ b→ c
a ∧ b→ d
✸n1a ∧✸n2b→ ✸n1+n2+1c ∨✸0d
(RN)
¬a
¬✸0a
((G1) and (N) are easily derived from (RG1) and (RN), respectively; (G2) follows
by (A1) taking n2 = 0; and (G3) may be derived using (A1) and (A2)). All these
rules are subsumed by the rule schema
(G)
∑n
i=1 ai ≤
∑m
j=1 bj∧n
i=1✸kiai →
∨m
j=1✸ljbj
,
where n,m ≥ 0, subject to the side condition
∑n
i=1(ki + 1) ≥ 1 +
∑m
j=1 lj (which
entails that n andm cannot both be 0). One-step soundness of (G) follows from one-
step soundness of the rule system for majority logic proved in the next example. By
the preceding considerations, (G) is weakly complete, and hence one-step complete
by Proposition 5.3.
Resolution closedness of (G): Take two instances of (G), one denoted like in the
general form of the rule and one with all entities primed (a′i etc.), with the resolution
taking place w.l.o.g. by matching ✸k′
1
a′1 ≡ ✸l1b1. The conclusion of the arising
resolvent is
n∧
i=1
✸kiai ∧
m′∧
i=2
✸k′
i
a′i →
m∨
i=2
✸ljbj ∨
m′∨
j=1
✸l′
j
b′j .
Since a′1 ≡ b1, the premises
∑n
i=1 ai ≤
∑m
j=1 bj and
∑n′
i=1 a
′
i ≤
∑m′
j=1 b
′
j imply
n∑
i=1
ai +
n′∑
i=2
a′i ≤
m∑
j=2
bj +
m′∑
j=1
b′j,
and since k1 = l
′
1, the side conditions
∑n
i=1(ki+1) ≥ 1+
∑m
j=1 lj and
∑n′
i=1(k
′
i+1) ≥
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1 +
∑m′
i=1 l
′
j imply
n∑
i=1
(ki + 1) +
n′∑
i=2
(k′i + 1) ≥ 1 +
m∑
j=2
lj +
m′∑
j=1
l′j ,
so that we arrive again at an instance of (G).
(7) Majority logic: in [Pacuit and Salame 2004], the extension of the axiomati-
zation of graded modal logic with the axioms
(M1) Ma ∧Mb→ ✸0(a ∧ b)
(M2) Ma ∧0(a→ b)→Mb
(M3) Wa ∧Wb ∧✸n(¬a ∧ ¬b)→ ✸n(a ∧ b)
(M4) Wa ∧Mb ∧✸n(¬a ∧ ¬b)→ ✸n+1(a ∧ b)
is proved to be weakly complete for majority logic including propositional symbols.
These axioms are derivable from the set of rules
(RM1)
a ∨ b
Wa ∨Wb
(RM2)
a→ b ∨ c
Wa→Wb ∨✸0c
(RM3)
¬(a ∧ c)
¬(b ∧ c)
a ∧ b→ d
Wa ∧Wb ∧✸nc→ ✸nd
(RM4)
¬a ∧ b
a→ c ∨ d
b→ c
Wa ∧✸nb→Wc ∨✸n+1d
((M2), (M3) and (M4) follow directly from (RM2), (RM3) and (RM4), respec-
tively; (RM1) proves Ma → Wa, whence (M1) is obtained from (RM2)). These
rules and rule (G) for GML are subsumed by the rule schema
(Mu)
∑n
i=1 ai +
∑v
r=1 cr + u ≤
∑m
j=1 bj +
∑w
s=1 ds∧n
i=1✸kiai ∧
∧v
r=1Wcr →
∨m
j=1✸ljbj ∨
∨w
s=1Wds
(u ∈ Z)
with side conditions
∑n
i=1(ki+1)−
∑m
j=1 lj−1+w−max(u, 0) ≥ 0 and v−w+2u ≥ 0
(take u = 1 for (RM1), u = 0 for (RM2), (RM4), and (G), and u = −1 for
(RM3)). Resolution closedness is checked analogously as for graded modal logic,
covering the two cases of resolution at literals ✸na and Wa, respectively; in both
cases, an instance of Mu1+u2 can be taken as a resolvent of an instance of Mu1 and
an instance of Mu2 .
One-step soundness of (Mu): Let τ be a P(X)-valuation such that X, τ |=∑n
i=1 ai +
∑v
r=1 cr + u ≤
∑m
j=1 bj +
∑w
s=1 ds. Let B ∈ B(X). Using Lemma 3.17,
we obtain by summation over x ∈ X
n∑
i=1
B(σ(ai)) +
v∑
r=1
B(σ(cr)) + uB(X) ≤
m∑
j=1
B(σ(bj)) +
w∑
s=1
B(σ(ds)).
Now put p = ⌈B(X)/2⌉ (with ⌈x⌉ = min{z ∈ Z | z ≥ x}) so that B satisfies Wa iff
B(τ(a)) ≥ p. To establish that B is in the interpretation of the conclusion of Mu,
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it suffices to prove
n∑
i=1
(ki + 1) + vp+ uB(X) ≥
m∑
j=1
lj + w(p− 1) + 1.
By the side conditions, this inequality is equivalent to
−2up+ uB(X) + max(u, 0) ≥ 0,
which is easily established by distinguishing the cases B(X) = 2p and B(X) =
2p− 1.
(8) Probabilistic modal logic: By reformulating the one-step complete set of ax-
ioms for probabilistic modal logic given by Cıˆrstea and Pattinson [2007] as one-step
rules and subsequently applying resolution, one obtains the rules
(Pu)
∑n
i=1 ai + u ≤
∑m
j=1 bj∧n
i=1 Lpiai →
∨m
j=1 Lqjbj
,
where m,n ≥ 0, m+ n ≥ 1, and u ∈ Z, subject to the side condition∑n
i=1 pi + u ≥
∑m
j=1 qj and∑n
i=1 pi + u > 0 if m = 0.
One-step completeness of (Pu): The rule schema is one-step complete, as it sub-
sumes the following axiomatisation that has been shown to be one-step complete
in loc.cit.:
(0) L0a (⊤)
a
Lpa
(> 1)
¬a ∨ ¬b
¬Lpa ∨ ¬Lqb
(p+ q > 1)
(1)
a ∨ b
Lpa ∨ Lqb
(p+ q = 1)
(1)
∑r
i=1 ci =
∑s
j=1 d¯j∧r
i=1 Luici ∧
∧s
j=2 L(1−vj)dj → Lv1d1
,
where d¯1 = d1 and d¯j = ¬dj for j ≥ 2, and rule (1) is subject to the side condition
s∑
j=1
vj =
r∑
i=1
ui.
These rules are subsumed by the rule schema (Pu), as follows. Rule (0): take
m = 1, n = 0, u = 0, q1 = 0. Rule (⊤): take m = 1, n = 0, u = 1. Rule > 1:
take n = 2, m = 0, u = −1. Rule (1): take n = 0, m = 2, u = −1. Rule (1): take
m = 1, n = r+s−1, u = 1−s, and instantiate bi to ci for i = 1, . . . , r, bi to di−r+1
for i = r + 1, . . . , r + s − 1, a1 to d1, qi to ui for i = 1, . . . , r, qi to 1 − vi−r+1 for
i = r + 1, . . . , r + s− 1, and p1 to v1.
One-step soundness : Analogously to the previous example, using additionally that
one always has P (X) = 1.
Resolution closedness: Analogously as for graded modal logic; as a resolvent of an
instance of Pu1 and an instance of Pu2 , one can take an instance of Pu1+u2 .
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4. THE SHALLOW MODEL CONSTRUCTION
We now present the announced generic shallow model construction, which is based
on strictly one-step complete axiomatisations. The construction generalises results
from [Vardi 1989] (where the use of axiomatisations is implicit in certain lemmas).
Definition 4.1. The set MA(φ) of (top level) modal atoms of a formula φ is
defined recursively by MA(φ ∧ ψ) = MA(φ) ∪ MA(ψ), MA(¬φ) = MA(φ), and
MA(Lρ) = {Lρ}. (Note that φ ∈ Prop(MA(φ)).) A pseudovaluation is a conjunc-
tive clause H over Up(F(Λ)), represented as a set of literals (i.e. pseudovaluations
are identified modulo contraction and reordering of literals, which does not affect the
setMA(H) of modal atoms). A pseudovaluation is consistent if it is consistent as an
F(Λ)-formula. We say that H is a pseudovaluation for φ if MA(H) ⊆ MA(φ) and
H ⊢PL φ. If φ/ψ is a rule in RC and σ is a substitution such that ψσ ∈ Cl(MA(H))
and H ⊢PL ¬ψσ, then the negated instance ¬φσ of the premise φ is a demand of H .
This generalises the notion of demand [Blackburn et al. 2001, Definition 6.43] to
a coalgebraic setting. Note that by the dual of Lemma 3.2, all demands of a
pseudovaluation H are contained in H when regarded as sets of literals, unless H is
propositionally inconstent (i.e. contains both Lρ and ¬Lρ for some modal atom Lρ).
Lemma 4.2. Every consistent formula has a consistent pseudovaluation.
Proof. If φ is consistent, then one of the conjunctive clauses from its disjunctive
normal form (DNF) is consistent and hence is a consistent pseudovaluation for φ.
Lemma 4.3. Every demand of a consistent pseudovaluation is consistent.
Proof. By contraposition: Let H be a pseudovaluation, and let φ/ψ be a rule
in RC such that ψσ ∈ Cl(MA(H)) and H ⊢PL ¬ψσ. If the demand ¬φσ is incon-
sistent, then φσ is provable; hence, ψσ is provable using φ/ψ, and consequently H
is inconsistent.
Definition 4.4. A supporting Kripke frame of a T -coalgebra (X, ξ) is a Kripke
frame (X,K) (consisting of a set X and a transition relation K ⊆ X×X) such that
for each x ∈ X ,
ξ(x) ∈ T {y | xKy} ⊆ TX.
Lemma and Definition 4.5. If a coalgebra C = (X, ξ) is equipped with a sup-
porting Kripke frame (X,K), then for every state x ∈ X, the set Xx of states
reachable from x in (X,K) is the carrier of a subcoalgebra Cx = (Xx, ξx) of C, the
submodel generated by x.
Note that by Proposition 2.5, y |=Cx φ iff y |=C φ for y ∈ Xx.
Definition 4.6. A shallow tableau is a Kripke frame (X,K) with a distinguished
root H0 ∈ X such that X is a set of pseudovaluations, every state is reachable
from H0, for all H,G ∈ X ,
HKG =⇒ G is a pseudovaluation for a demand of H,
and for every demand φ of H ∈ X there exists a pseudovaluation G ∈ X for φ such
that HKG. Given a formula φ, a shallow tableau for φ is a shallow tableau whose
root is a pseudovaluation for φ.
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A shallow tableau model is a T -coalgebra C = (X, ξ) which has a supporting
Kripke frame (X,K) such that (X,K) is a shallow tableau and the truth lemma
H ⊢PL χ =⇒ H |=C χ for all F(Λ)-formulas χ
holds for all H ∈ X (hence in particular H |=C χ if H is a pseudovaluation for χ).
A shallow tableau is almost a dag, except that in the presence of the rule ⊥/⊥ (cf.
Section 3) the pseudovaluation ⊤ is a pseudovaluation for one of its own demands.
Explicitly:
Proposition 4.7. A shallow tableau (X,K) with root H0 is, up to a possible
loop at the state ⊤, a dag of depth at most the depth of H0, and the branching
degree at H ∈ X is exponentially bounded in |H |.
Proof. The first claim follows from the fact the the depth of all demands of
a pseudovaluation H is strictly less than the depth of H . To prove the bound on
branching, note that pseudovaluations for demands of H are conjunctive clauses
over the set of subformulas of H .
Lemma 4.8. If a formula φ has a pseudovaluation H0 such that all demands of
H0 are consistent, then there exists a shallow tableau for φ.
(By Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3, the conditions of the above lemma hold in particular if φ
is satisfiable.)
Proof. Let Z consist of H0 and all consistent pseudovaluations, and for H,G ∈
Z put HK¯G iff G is a pseudovaluation for a demand of H . Let (X,K) be the
subframe of (Z, K¯) generated by H0 (i.e. X is the set of states reachable from H0 in
(Z, K¯), and K = K¯∩ (X×X)). By the assumption on H0 and Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3,
(X,K) is a shallow tableau for φ.
Theorem 4.9. If R is strictly one-step complete, then every shallow tableau is
a supporting Kripke frame of a shallow tableau model.
Proof. Let (X,K) be a shallow tableau; we have to construct a shallow tableau
model C = (X, ξ) for which (X,K) is a supporting Kripke frame. To begin, note
that to ensure the truth lemma, it suffices that C is coherent in the sense that for
H ∈ X and Y = {G | HKG},
H ⊢PL Lρ ⇐⇒ ξ(H) ∈ [[L]]Y {G ∈ Y | G |=CG ρ} for all Lρ ∈ MA(H)
(cf. Lemma and Definition 4.5) : note that {G ∈ Y | G |=CG ρ} = [[ρ]]C ∩Y , so that
by naturality of predicate liftings, coherence implies that
H ⊢PL Lρ ⇐⇒ H |=C Lρ for all Lρ ∈ MA(H).
The extension to propositional consequences of H is then straightforward (noting
that for Lρ ∈ MA(H), either H ⊢PL Lρ or H ⊢PL ¬Lρ).
We construct a coherent coalgebra structure ξ by induction over the depth of
pseudovaluations. Thus, let H ∈ X , put Y = {G | HKG}, and assume that ξ is
already constructed for all pseudovaluations of smaller depth in X , in particular for
all states G reachable from H in (X,K). Thus, the submodel CG generated by such
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a state G is already defined, and coherence at G is unaffected by the construction
of ξ(H).
We have to prove that there exists ξ(H) ∈ TY ⊆ TX satisfying the coherence
condition. Assume the contrary. Let V be the set of propositional variables bρ,
where Lρ ∈ MA(H) for some L. Let θ ∈ Cl(Up(V )) consist of the literals ¬Lbρ
for Lρ ∈ H and Lbρ for ¬Lρ ∈ H . By assumption, TY, τ
Y |= θ, where τY is the
P(Y )-valuation taking bρ to {G ∈ Y | G |=CG ρ}. By strict one-step completeness,
it follows that ψη ⊢PL θ for a rule φ/ψ in RC and a V -substitution η such that
Y, τY |= φη. By construction of θ, H ⊢PL ¬θσ and hence H ⊢PL ¬ψησ. Thus,
¬φησ is a demand for H , and hence there exists in Y a pseudovaluationG for ¬φησ.
By the truth lemma for G, G |=CG ¬φησ, in contradiction to Y, τ
Y |= φη.
Corollary 4.10. If R is strictly one-step complete, then the following are
equivalent for an F(Λ)-formula φ.
(1 ) φ is satisfiable.
(2 ) φ is consistent.
(3 ) φ has a pseudovaluation H such that all demands of H are consistent.
(4 ) φ has a pseudovaluation H such that all demands of H are satisfiable.
(5 ) There exists a shallow tableau for φ.
(6 ) φ is satisfiable at the root of a shallow tableau model.
Proof. (1) =⇒ (2): By soundness.
(2) =⇒ (3): By Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3
(3) =⇒ (5): By Lemma 4.8.
(5) =⇒ (6): By Theorem 4.9.
(6) =⇒ (1): Trivial.
(3)⇐⇒ (4): By the equivalence (1)⇐⇒ (2) already established.
The above implies in particular that the proof system is weakly complete, i.e. proves
all valid formulas; this reproves a result of [Pattinson 2003]. By Remark 3.8, we
obtain moreover that coalgebraic modal logic has the shallow model property:
Corollary 4.11 Shallow model property. Every satisfiable F(Λ)-
formula φ is satisfiable in a shallow model, i.e. in a T -coalgebra that has a
supporting Kripke frame (X,K) which has final state x⊤, i.e. x⊤Kx implies
x = x⊤, and which, up to a possible loop at x⊤, is a dag of depth at most the depth
of φ and of size at most 3n, where n is the number of subformulas of φ.
Proof. All that remains to be checked is the bound on the size: every state in
a shallow tableau is a set representing a conjunctive clause over subformulas of φ,
in which a given subformula may occur as a positive literal, as a negative literal, or
not at all.
5. SHALLOW PROOFS
The satisfiability criterion of Corollary 4.10 can be rephrased in terms of a shal-
low proof property. This property can be proved semantically by dualising Corol-
lary 4.10, as done in the proof of Corollary 5.1 below. Alternatively, the shallow
proof property can be established purely syntactically, without any reference to
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models; we present such an argument in the proof of Theorem 5.2 below. The shal-
low model construction presented in the previous section is however of independent
interest.
Corollary 5.1 Shallow Proof Property. Let R be strictly one-step com-
plete. Then an F(Λ)-formula φ is provable iff for each clause ρ in the conjunctive
normal form (CNF) of φ, there exists a rule χ/ψ ∈ RC and a substitution σ such
that ψσ ⊢PL ρ and χσ is provable.
Proof. The ‘if’ direction is trivial; we prove ‘only if’. Dualizing the implication
(3) =⇒ (2) in Corollary 4.10 yields
if φ is provable then each pseudovaluation H for ¬φ has a demand χ
such that ¬χ is provable.
Now let ρ be a clause in the CNF of φ. Then ¬ρ is a conjunctive clause in the DNF
of ¬φ, in particular a pseudovaluation for ¬φ. By the above condition, there exists
a rule χ/ψ ∈ RC and a substitution σ such that ¬ρ ⊢PL ¬ψσ, hence ψσ ⊢PL ρ,
and χσ is provable.
In a purely syntactic formulation of the shallow proof property, we have to replace
strict completeness by closedness under resolution. The statement thus takes the
following form.
Theorem 5.2 Shallow Proof Property. Let R be resolution closed. Then
an F(Λ)-formula φ is provable under R iff for each clause ρ in the CNF of φ, there
exists a rule χ/ψ ∈ RC and a substitution σ such that ψσ ⊢PL ρ and χσ is provable.
(This reproves Corollary 5.1, as strict one-step completeness implies resolution
closedness by Theorem 3.16.)
Proof. Again, ‘if’ is trivial, and we prove ‘only if’. Let φ be provable, and
let ρ be a clause in the CNF of φ. Then ρ is provable. By definition of the proof
system, ρ is propositionally entailed by the set of clauses
Φ = {ψσ | χ/ψ ∈ RC , χσ provable}.
One shows analogously as in the ‘if’ direction of the proof of Theorem 3.16 that Ψ
is resolution closed. By Lemma 3.14, there exists ψσ in Φ such that ψσ ⊢PL ρ.
We hope that both proofs of the shallow proof property provide a handle for gen-
eralizations to logics outside rank 1.
One application of the shallow proof property is
Proposition 5.3. Let Λ contain an infinite set U of propositional symbols, mod-
elled as in Remark 2.8 over a functor TU of the form TUX = TX × P(U). Then
the proof system induced by R is weakly complete iff R is one-step complete.
Proof. W.l.o.g. R is resolution closed (one can close under resolution, thereby
affecting neither completeness nor one-step completeness). The ‘if’ direction is
known (cf. Remark 3.8). To prove the ‘only if’ direction, let ψ ∈ Cl(Up(V )), let X
be a set, and let τ be a P(X)-valuation such that TUX, τ |= ψ. Since U is infinite
and V may be assumed to be finite, we can assume w.l.o.g. that V ⊆ U . Let φ denote
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the propositional theory of τ , i.e. the conjunction of all contracted clauses χ over V
such that X, τ |= χ. Then one checks as in the proof of Theorem 17 in [Schro¨der
2007] that the rule φ/ψ is one-step sound. By Lemma 16 in [Schro¨der 2007], there
exists a Prop(V )-substitution σ such that φσ and φ→ (a↔ σ(a)) (for each a ∈ V )
are propositional tautologies. Since V ⊆ U , we can regard φσ as an F(Λ)-formula.
As such, φσ is valid. By soundness of φ/ψ, it follows that ψσ, again regarded as an
F(Λ)-formula, is valid, hence provable by weak completeness. By the shallow proof
property (Theorem 5.2), there exist a rule χ/ρ overW and a Prop(V )-substitution θ
such that χθ is provable and ρθ ⊢PL ψσ. By Lemma 3.2 and Assumption 3.10, it
follows that there exists a V -substitution κ such that σ(κ(b)) = θ(b) for all b ∈ W
and ρκ ⊢PL ψ.
It remains to prove that X, τ |= χκ. From X, τ |= φ and the construction of σ,
we obtain X, τ |= a ↔ σ(a) for all a ∈ V and hence X, τ |= κ(b) ↔ θ(b) for all
b ∈W , so that the goal follows from X, τ |= χθ.
Remark 5.4. In the above result, the assumption that Λ contains enough propo-
sitional symbols is essential. E.g. in cases like coalition logic or probabilistic modal
logic where the logic collapses into triviality without propositional symbols, the
empty set of rules is complete, but not one-step complete.
The proof-theoretic content of Theorem 5.2 goes beyond the mere fact that proofs
are shallow. The theorem asserts that if the rule system is resolution closed, then
propositional reasoning can always be limited to decomposing a formula into the
clauses of its CNF and propositional entailment (i.e. by Lemma 3.2 essentially
containment) between clauses. Moreover, shallow proofs witness a weak subformula
property: every provable formula has a proof that mentions only propositional
combinations of subformulas. Formally:
Theorem 5.5 Weak subformula property. Suppose that R is resolution
closed and φ is derivable under R. Then there exists a proof of φ that mentions
only propositional combinations of subformulas of φ.
Proof. Assume that φ is derivable under R and ρ is a clause of the CNF of φ;
w.l.o.g. ρ is not a tautology. By Theorem 5.2 we find a rule χ/ψ ∈ R and a
substitution σ such that ψσ ⊢PL ρ and χσ is provable under R; by Lemma 3.2, ρ
contains ψσ, hence we can assume w.l.o.g. that σ maps propositional variables to
subformulas of ρ. As χ is a purely propositional formula, the substituted premise
χσ is a propositional combinations of subformulas of ρ, hence also of φ. The claim
now follows inductively.
As a consequence, it is immediate that F(Λ) is a conservative extension of any
sublanguage F(Λ0) induced by a sub-signature Λ0 ⊆ Λ:
Corollary 5.6 Conservativity. Suppose R is resolution closed, Λ0 ⊆ Λ is a
sub-signature and R0 consists of those φ/ψ ∈ R that mention only modal operators
in Λ0. Then a formula φ ∈ F(Λ0) is R-derivable iff it is R0-derivable.
In particular, if R is weakly complete for F(Λ), then R0 is weakly complete
for F(Λ0).
Example 5.7. From completeness of the rules (Mu) for majority logic (Exam-
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ple 3.18.7), we obtain that the rules
(Wu)
∑v
r=1 cr + u ≤
∑w
s=1 ds∧v
r=1Wcr →
∨w
s=1Wds
(u ∈ Z)
with side conditions w − 1 − max(u, 0) ≥ 0 and v − w + 2u ≥ 0 form a complete
axiomatisation of the majority operator W alone. (Pauly [2005] considers a similar
language, but without nesting of modal operators in formulas.)
6. A GENERIC PSPACE ALGORITHM
We will now exploit the shallow model result (Corollary 4.10) to design a decision
procedure for satisfiability in the spirit of [Vardi 1989]. This requires one more
preparatory step: since resolution closed rule sets are in general infinite, we must
ensure that we never need to instantiate a rule in such a way that the conclusion
contains the same literal twice; otherwise, determining the demands of a given
pseudovaluation (Definition 4.1) might require checking infinitely many rules. This
is formally captured as follows.
Definition 6.1. An instance φσ/ψσ of a rule φ/ψ is contracted if the clause ψσ is
contracted (Definition 3.1). In this case, if H is a pseudovaluation (Definition 4.1)
such that ψσ ∈ Cl(MA(H)) and H ⊢PL ¬ψσ, the demand ¬φσ of H is called an
essential demand. We say that a set R of rules is closed under contraction if for
every V -instance φσ/ψσ of a rule φ/ψ over V in R, there exists a contracted V -
instance φ′σ′/ψ′σ′ of a rule φ′/ψ′ ∈ R such that ψ′σ′ propositionally entails ψσ
and φσ propositionally entails φ′σ′.
I.e. a rule set is closed under contraction if every instance of a rule that duplicates
literals in the conclusion can be replaced by a contracted instance of a different rule.
Not all the rule sets discussed in Example 3.18 satisfy this property, but they can
easily be closed under contraction: just add a rule φ′/ψ′ for every rule φ/ψ over V
in R and every V -substitution σ, where φ′ is some suitably chosen propositional
equivalent of φσ and ψ′ is obtained from ψσ by removing duplicate literals. It is
clear that the new rules remain one-step sound. Note that extending the rule set
trivially preserves strict one-step completeness, so that there is no need to close the
extended rule set under resolution again.
For convenience, we introduce further notation for propositional formulas: if
r ∈ Z− {0} and φ is a formula, then we put
sgn(r)φ =
{
φ r > 0
¬φ r < 0.
Example 6.2. (1) The strictly one-step complete rule sets of Examples 3.18.1–
5 (E,M , K,KD, and coalition logic) are easily seen to be closed under contraction,
essentially because in all relevant rule schemas, the premise is a clause of the same
general format as the conclusion.
(2) Graded modal logic: The rule schema (G) of Example 3.18.6 fails to be closed
under contraction, as duplicating literals in the conclusion substantially affects both
the premise and the side condition. We can close (G) under contraction as described
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above; this results in the rule schema
(G′)
∑n
i=1 riai ≥ 0∨n
i=1 sgn(ri)✸kiai
,
where n ≥ 1 and r1, . . . , rn ∈ Z− {0}, subject to the side condition
∑
ri<0
ri(ki +
1) ≥ 1 +
∑
ri>0
riki.
(3) Majority logic: Similarly, closing the rule schema (Mm) for majority logic
under contraction yields the rule schema
(M ′m)
m ≤
∑n
i=1 riai +
∑v
j=1 sjbj∨
sgn(ri)✸kiai ∨
∨
sgn(sj)Wbj
(ri, sj ∈ Z− {0},m ∈ Z)
with side conditions
∑
ri<0
ri(ki+1)− (
∑
ri>0
riki)−1+
∑
sj>0
sj−max(m, 0) ≥ 0
and 2m−
∑
sj ≥ 0.
(4) Probabilistic modal logic: The rule schema (Pk) of Example 3.18.8 fails to
be closed under contraction. Closure under contraction as described above leads to
the rule schema
(P ′k)
∑n
i=1 riai ≥ k∨
1≤i≤n sgn(ri)Lpiai
where n ≥ 1 and r1, . . . , rn ∈ Z− {0}, subject to the side condition∑n
i=1 ripi ≤ k, and
if ∀i. ri < 0 then
∑n
i=1 ripi < k.
The crucial property of contraction closed rule sets is
Lemma 6.3. If R is closed under contraction, then all the demands of a pseu-
dovaluation are satisfiable iff all its essential demands are satisfiable.
Proof. The ‘only if’ direction is trivial. We prove ‘if’: Let R be closed un-
der contraction. Then also RC is closed under contraction, since instances of the
congruence rule never contain duplicate literals. Thus, every demand of a pseu-
dovaluation H is propositionally entailed by an essential demand.
Thus we can extend Corollary 4.10 as follows.
Corollary 6.4. If R is strictly one-step complete and closed under contraction,
then an F(Λ)-formula φ is satisfiable iff φ has a pseudovaluation H such that all
essential demands of H are satisfiable.
In the algorithm suggested by Corollary 6.4, we will encode demands, which are
themselves too large to be passed around directly, by the rules that induce them.
Here, we need to represent rules by suitable codes, i.e. strings over some alphabet,
since a naive direct representation of rules would in particular have to deal with
rule premises of potentially exponential size.
Definition 6.5. We say that a rule R ∈ R matches a clause ρ ≡
∨n
i=1 ǫiLiφi
if the conclusion of R is of the form
∨n
i=1 ǫiLiai. In this case, let σ(R, ρ) denote
the arising substitution [φi/ai]i=1,...,n. Two rules matching the same clause are
equivalent if their premises are propositionally equivalent; equivalence classes [R]
are called R-matchings. The code of R is also a code for [R].
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We fix some size measures for the representation of formulas and rules:
Definition 6.6. The size size(a) of an integer a is ⌈log2(|a| + 1)⌉, where ⌈r⌉ =
min{z ∈ Z | z ≥ r} as usual. The size size(p) of a rational number p = a/b, with
a, b relatively prime, is 1 + size(a) + size(b). The size |φ| of a formula φ over V is
defined by counting 1 for each propositional variable, boolean operator, or modal
operator, and additionally the size of each index of a modal operator. (In the
examples, indices are either numbers, with sizes as above, or subsets of {1, . . . , n},
assumed to be of size n.)
Assumption 6.7. We assume a reasonable encoding of modal formulas in which
boolean operators take up constant space and modal operators take up space ac-
cording to a given coding of Λ; we assume that this coding is in NP (i.e. it is
decidable in NP whether a given code is a valid code for a modal operator in Λ).
Graded or probabilistic modal operators are assumed to be coded in binary, with
sizes according to Definition 6.6.
Example 6.8. For the rules of Examples 3.18 and 6.2, we just take the parameters
of a rule as its code in the obvious way. E.g. the code of an instance of (P ′k)
as displayed in Example 6.2.4 consists of n, k, the ri, and the pi. The size of
the code is determined by the sizes of these numbers plus separating letters, say,∑
(1 + size(ai)) +
∑
(1 + size(pi)) + size(n) + size(k) + 1. Note that not all such
codes represent instances of (P ′k).
The following decision procedure on an alternating Turing machine generalises the
PSPACE algorithms in [Vardi 1989], given a strictly one-step complete and con-
traction closed rule set R.
Algorithm 6.9. (Decide satisfiability of φ ∈ F(Λ))
(1) (Existential) Guess a propositionally consistent pseudovaluation H for φ.
(2) (Universal) Choose a contracted clause⊥ 6= ρ overMA(H) such thatH ⊢PL ¬ρ.
(3) (Universal) Choose an RC -matching [R] of ρ.
(4) (Existential) Guess a clause γ from the CNF of the premise of R.
(5) Recursively check that ¬γσ(R, ρ) is satisfiable.
The algorithm succeeds if all possible choices at steps marked universal lead to
successful termination, and for all steps marked existential, there exists a choice
leading to successful termination. Concerning Step 1, note that the only way for a
pseudovaluation to be propositionally inconsistent is to contain both Lρ and ¬Lρ
for some modal atom Lρ.
We emphasise that in Step 3, it suffices to guess one code for each matching.
Proposition 6.10. Algorithm 6.9 succeeds iff the input formula φ is satisfiable.
Proof. Induction over the depth n of φ. If n = 0, then the propositional for-
mula φ will evaluate to either ⊤ or ⊥, as it does not contain any propositional
variables; moreover, the only candidate for a pseudovaluation for φ is the empty
conjunctive clause ⊤. Thus, the algorithm terminates unsuccessfully in the existen-
tial step (1) iff φ evaluates to ⊥, since ⊤ is a pseudovaluation for φ iff φ evaluates
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to ⊤. Otherwise, the algorithm terminates successfully in the universal step (2),
since the only clause ρ over MA(⊤) = ∅ such that ⊤ ⊢PL ¬ρ is ⊥. For n > 0, cor-
rectness of the algorithm follows from Corollary 6.4 and the inductive hypothesis:
the essential demands of φ are the negated premises ¬φσ(φ/ψ, ρ) for RC -matchings
[φ/ψ] of contracted clauses ρ as in the algorithm, and such a demand is satisfiable
iff the negation of one of the clauses in the CNF of φσ(φ/ψ, ρ) is satisfiable.
Remark 6.11. In Step 1 of Algorithm 6.9, it suffices to consider the conjunctive
clauses in some DNF of φ rather than all pseudovaluations. A canonical, if not
necessarily the most effective choice for such a DNF is to take all pseudovaluationsH
for φ such thatMA(H) = MA(φ) (rather than onlyMA(H) ⊆ MA(φ)); in a concrete
implementation, a heuristic procedure for determining some DNF effectively may
be preferable.
Note that due to the non-deterministic nature of the algorithm, the above propo-
sition does not imply decidability of F(Λ). This follows only if the algorithm
respects suitable resource bounds. We are interested in cases where the algorithm
runs in polynomial time. The crucial requirement for this is that Steps 3 and 4
can be performed in polynomial time, i.e. by suitable nondeterministic polynomial-
time multivalued functions (NPMV) [Book et al. 1984]. We recall that a function
f : Σ∗ → P(∆∗), where Σ and ∆ are alphabets, is NPMV iff
(NPMV1) there exists a polynomial p such that |y| ≤ p(|x|) for all y ∈ f(x),
where | · | denotes size, and
(NPMV2) the graph {(x, y) | y ∈ f(x)} of f is in NP .
This motivates the following conditions:
Definition 6.12. A set R of rules is called PSPACE-tractable if there exists a
polynomial p such that all R-matchings of a contracted clause ρ over F(Λ) have
some code of size at most p(|ρ|) (recall that matchings are equivalence classes of
rules and thus may have several codes), and it can be decided in NP
(1) whether a given code is the code of some rule in R;
(2) whether a rule matches a given contracted clause; and
(3) whether a clause belongs to the CNF of the premise of a given rule.
Theorem 6.13 Space Complexity. Let R be strictly one-step complete,
closed under contraction, and PSPACE-tractable. Then the satisfiability problem
for F(Λ) is in PSPACE.
Proof. Since R is PSPACE -tractable, so is RC , assuming reasonable codes for
the congruence rules (e.g. consisting of the representation of the relevant modal
operator; cf. Assumption 6.7). Thus, the functions mapping a clause ρ to the set of
itsRC -matchings and a rule to the set of clauses occurring in the CNF of its premise,
respectively, are NPMV: in the former case, the polynomial bound required by
condition (NPMV1) is ensured by the definition of PSPACE -tractability, as we only
need to produce one code for each matching, and in the latter case, the polynomial
bound holds universally, as clauses are of polynomial size. Condition (NPMV2)
is ensured explicitly by Definition 6.12 and Assumption 6.7 (which implies that
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the set of formulas is in NP). Therefore, Steps 3 and 4 in Algorithm 6.9 can be
performed in polynomial time. Steps 1 and 2 have polynomial runtime without
specific assumptions, as a pseudovaluation H for φ is represented as a set of literals
and must by definition satisfyMA(H) ⊆ MA(φ), and the contracted clause ρ chosen
in Step 2 is constructed as a non-repetitive list of literals whose negations belong
to H . Since the depth of recursion is bounded by the depth of φ, it follows that
the algorithm runs in APTIME = PSPACE [Chandra et al. 1981].
Remark 6.14. A more careful analysis of Algorithm 6.9 reveals that it suffices for
the decision problems in Definition 6.12 to be in PH , the polynomial time hierarchy.
In our examples, however, the complexity is in fact P rather than NP . We expect
that this situation is typical, with the crucial condition for PSPACE -tractability
being the polynomial bound on R-matchings. We are not aware of any natural
examples of intractable rule sets (contrived examples are easy to construct, e.g. by
imposing computationally hard side conditions).
Remark 6.15. Algorithm 6.9 can be dualised to yield a proof-search procedure
that determines whether φ ∈ L(Λ) is R-derivable, thus implementing the shallow
proof property (Corollary 5.1/Theorem 5.2). Note that the dualisation entails that
the roles of existential and universal steps are interchanged.
In the treatment of graded and propositional modal logic, the polynomial bound
on rule codes follows rather directly from size estimates in integer linear pro-
gramming, as follows. Following usual practice, we take the size |W | of a ra-
tional inequality W ≡ (
∑n
i=1 uixi op u0), op ∈ {<,≤, >,≥} and ui ∈ Q, to be
1 + n+
∑n
i=0 size(ui). We recall that for n ∈ Z, sgn(n) = −1 if n < 0, sgn(n) = 1
if n > 0, and sgn(n) = 0 if n = 0.
Lemma 6.16. For every rational linear inequality W and every solution
r0, . . . , rn ∈ Z of W , there exists a solution s0, . . . , sn ∈ Z of W such that sgn(si) =
sgn(ri) for all i, the propositional formulas
∑n
i=1 siai ≥ s0 and
∑n
i=1 riai ≥ r0 (cf.
Section 3) are equivalent, and size(si) ≤ 18|W |4 for all i.
Proof. Let V = {a1, . . . , an}, and let x0, . . . , xn be the variables in W . We
note that a propositional formula
∑n
i=1 siai ≥ s0 is equivalent to φ ≡
∑n
i=1 riai ≥
a0 iff for all valuations ν : V → {0, 1}, one has
∑n
i=1 siν(ai) ≥ s0 if and only
if
∑n
i=1 riν(ai) ≥ r0, read as integer linear inequalities. Thus, let I denote the
system of inequalities consisting of W and additional inqualities Fi and Eν , where
i = 1, . . . , n, ν ranges over valuations V → {0, 1},
Fi =


xi ≥ 1 if ri ≥ 1
xi = 0 if ri = 0
xi ≤ −1 if ri ≤ −1
(where the middle case actually corresponds to two inequalities), and
Eν =
{∑n
i=1 xiν(ai) ≥ x0 if
∑n
i=1 riν(ai) ≥ r0∑n
i=1 xiν(ai) < x0 if
∑n
i=1 riν(ai) < r0.
Then the claim translates into the statement that I has a solution of polynomially
bounded size in |W |.
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It follows from [Schrijver 1986, Corollary 17.1b] that I has a solution whose size
is bounded by 6c(n+1)3, where c is the facet complexity of the system, i.e. the size
of the largest inequality in I. As the cofficients of the inequalities Eν and Fi are
of size at most 1, we have c ≤ |W |+ 2(n+ 1). Since moreover |W | ≥ n+ 1, I thus
has a solution of size at most 18|W |4.
We now illustrate how Theorem 6.13 allows us to establish PSPACE bounds for
many modal logics in a uniform way.
Example 6.17. Conditions (1) and (2) of Definition 6.12 are immediate for all
the rule sets of Example 3.18 — the decision problems in question involve no more
than checking computationally harmless side conditions in the case of Condition (1)
(disjointness and containment of finite sets, linear inequalities), and comparing
clauses of polynomial (in fact, linear) size in the case of Condition (2). Moreover,
Condition (3) is immediate in those cases where the premises of rules are just single
clauses. This leaves only GML and PML; but the expansion of
∑
i∈I riai ≥ k to
a propositional formula is already in CNF, and checking whether a given clause
belongs to this CNF is clearly in P .
It remains to establish the polynomial bound on the matchings. For GML and
PML, this is guaranteed precisely by Lemma 6.16. In all other cases, every con-
tracted clause ρ matches at most one rule, whose code has size linear in the size
of ρ.
We thus have obtained PSPACE -tractability and hence decidability in PSPACE
for all logics in Example 3.18. The logics E and M are of lesser interest here, being
actually in NP [Vardi 1989]. We briefly comment on the algorithms and bounds
for the other cases.
(1) For the modal logics K and KD (Examples 3.18.3 and 4), Algorithm 6.9 is
essentially the witness algorithm [Ladner 1977; Vardi 1989; Blackburn et al. 2001].
Both logics are PSPACE -hard [Ladner 1977].
(2) For coalition logic (Example 3.18.5), we arrive, due to minor differences of
the rule sets, at a slight variant of Pauly’s PSPACE -algorithm [Pauly 2002].
(3) For graded modal logic, we obtain a new algorithm which confirms the known
PSPACE upper bound [Tobies 2001]. One might claim that the new algorithm is
not only nicely embedded into a unified framework, but also conceptually simpler
than the constraint-based algorithm of [Tobies 2001] (which corrects a similar but
incorrect algorithm previously given elsewhere, and refutes a previous EXPTIME
hardness conjecture). Graded modal logic is PSPACE -hard, as it extends K.
(4) For probabilistic modal logic, we obtain a new algorithm which confirms
the PSPACE upper bound that follows from the corresponding bound for the
more expressive (modal) logic of probability, a proof of which is sketched in [Fagin
and Halpern 1994]. The bound is tight, as PML contains the PSPACE -complete
logic KD as a fragment (embedded by mapping ✷ to L1). In comparison to the
algorithm in loc. cit., our algorithm has additional proof theoretic content as dis-
cussed in Section 5. Under the correspondence outlined in Remark 6.15, it finds
proofs which remain within PML rather than possibly diverting via a more expres-
sive logic.
PSPACE Bounds for Rank-1 Modal Logics · 27
(5) Our PSPACE upper bound for majority logic, which appeared for the first
time in the conference presentation of [Schro¨der and Pattinson 2006], tied in a pri-
ority race with [Demri and Lugiez 2006], where a PSPACE upper bound was proved
for the more expressive Presburger modal logic using a different type of algorithm.
The same remarks concerning proof-theoretic content apply as for probabilistic
modal logic.
7. CONCLUSION
Generalising results by Vardi [1989], we have shown that coalgebraic modal logic has
the shallow model property, and we have presented a generic PSPACE algorithm
for satisfiability based on depth-first exploration of shallow models. We have thus
—reproduced the witness algorithm for K and KD [Blackburn et al. 2001]
—obtained a slight variant of the known PSPACE algorithm for coalition
logic [Pauly 2002]
—obtained a new PSPACE algorithm for graded modal logic, recovering the known
PSPACE bound [Tobies 2001]
—obtained a new PSPACE algorithm for probabilistic modal logic [Larsen and
Skou 1991; Heifetz and Mongin 2001], recovering a PSPACE upper bound which
follows from results sketched in [Fagin and Halpern 1994].
—obtained, simultaneously with [Demri and Lugiez 2006], a new PSPACE upper
bound for majority logic [Pacuit and Salame 2004].
In all these cases, the PSPACE upper bound is tight. Our algorithm may alter-
natively be viewed as traversing a shallow proof that witnesses a weak subformula
property.
The crucial prerequisite for the generic algorithm is an axiomatisation by so-called
one-step rules (going from rank 0 to rank 1) obeying two closedness conditions:
closedness under resolution and under contraction, i.e. removal of duplicate literals.
In the examples, it has not only turned out that it is feasible to keep this closure
process under control, but also that the axiomatisations obtained have pleasingly
compact presentations — typically, one ends up with a single rule schema.
It has been shown that every modal logic can be equipped with a canonical
coalgebraic semantics, provided it is axiomatisable in rank 1 and satisfies the con-
gruence rule [Schro¨der and Pattinson 2007b]. This means in particular that our
shallow model construction applies to every such modal logic when equipped with
the canonical semantics. Moreover, the PSPACE -algorithm presented here can be
made modular w.r.t. heterogeneous combination of systems and modal logics using
multi-sorted coalgebra [Schro¨der and Pattinson 2007a]. The extension of the theory
beyond rank 1 is the subject of future research, as is the treatment of simple fixed
point operators, possibly using automata theoretic methods [Vardi 1996; Venema
2006] or pseudomodels [Emerson and Halpern 1985]. A further point of interest is
to investigate the connection between our notion of resolution closure and classical
proof-theoretic issues such as cut elimination and interpolation.
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